You will perhaps wonder
that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship,
should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written
something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the
world should make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought
strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present
state of the church and learning, and consequently ignorant how great an
ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me
to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by
that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's
character. I might add, my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty
you have been pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would
not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These
considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet,
and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with
the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue
which the world so justly admires in your lordship,
MY LORD,
Your lordship's most humble and
most devoted servant,
GEORGE BERKELEY
PREFACE
WHAT I here make public has,
after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed to me evidently true and not
unuseful to be known- particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism,
or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the
natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the
reader should impartially examine; since I do not think myself any farther
concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable
to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it my request that
the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole
through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter
shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves,
are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation,
and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon
an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though
the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is
very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter
myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of
novelty and singularity which some of the following notions may seem to
bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must
surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences,
who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration, for no other
reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to the prejudices of
mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible,
the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion
before they rightly comprehend it.
INTRODUCTION
1. Philosophy being nothing
else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected
that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater
calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge,
and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet
so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road
of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for
the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears
unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want
of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics.
But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light
of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature
of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds concerning those
things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors
of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring
to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes,
difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we
advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate
mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down
in a forlorn Scepticism.
2. The cause of this is thought to
be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of
our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have are few, and those
designed by nature for the support and comfort of life, and not to penetrate
into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of
man being finite, when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it
is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and contradictions,
out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being
of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite.
3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial
to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not
rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose
that right deductions from true principles should ever end in consequences
which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God
has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong
desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach.
This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence,
which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth
usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not
fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far
greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused
philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to
ourselves- that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot
see.
4. My purpose therefore is, to try
if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that
doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into
the several sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought
our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness
and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving
our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human
Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides, especially since there
may be some grounds to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which
stay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from
any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding,
so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might
have been avoided.
5. How difficult and discouraging
soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary
men have gone before me in the like designs, yet I am not without some
hopes- upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the
clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the
object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern
that which had escaped far better eyes.
6. In order to prepare the mind of
the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise
somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of Language.
But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate
my design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering
speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable
errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the
opinion that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or notions
of things. He who is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes
of philosophers must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent
about abstract ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be
the object of those sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics,
and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and
sublime learning, in all which one shall scarce find any question handled
in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that
it is well acquainted with them.
7. It is agreed on all hands that
the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart
by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and
blended together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind
being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other
qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to itself abstract
ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured,
and moved: this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple,
constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does
frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it
is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that
the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive
of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.
8. Again, the mind having observed
that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something
common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that
figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers
apart or singles out by itself that which is common, making thereof a most
abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid,
nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from
all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours
perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and
retaining that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in
abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate
colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly not only
from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all
particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed;
which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may
be perceived by sense.
9. And as the mind frames to itself
abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision
or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings
which include several coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having
observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other in certain common
agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded
idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is
peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an
abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake- abstracting
entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which
might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it
is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if you please, humanity,
or human nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there
is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black,
nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein
all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is
neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but something
abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, their being a
great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but not all,
of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts which are
peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living
creatures, frames the idea of animal, which abstracts not only from all
particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent
parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous
motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape or figure, there
being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering, either
of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers,
scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular
animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same
account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor
creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not
easy to conceive.
10. Whether others have this wonderful
faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I find
indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas
of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding
and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts
of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye,
the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body.
But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape
and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either
of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or
a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive
the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me
to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and
which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like
may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain,
I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular
parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united
in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them.
But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately,
those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that
I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner
aforesaid- which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. And
there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in
my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend
to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained
without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if
such there be, they are confined only to the learned.
11. I proceed to examine what can
be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can
discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an
opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been
a late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very
much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas
is what puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man
and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith he, "is that which puts
a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which
the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it is evident
we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal
ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty
of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words
or any other general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I think, we
may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated
from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated,
and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they have any ideas
at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot
deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do,
some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; but
it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses.
They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have
not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction."-
Essay on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this
learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to
abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that
sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be
reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have
no grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas is, that we observe
in them no use of words or any other general signs; which is built on this
supposition- that the making use of words implies the having general ideas.
From which it follows that men who use language are able to abstract or
generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author
will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts:
"Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general
terms?" His answer is: "Words become general by being made the signs of
general ideas."- Essay on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems
that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract
general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently
suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion
is proportional to the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension
is divisible," these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension
in general; and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my
thoughts an idea of motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction
and velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension,
which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black,
white, nor red, nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied
that whatever particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow,
perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom
concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular
extension, it matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this
or that magnitude or figure.
12. By observing how ideas become
general we may the better judge how words are made so. And here it is to
be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only
that there are any abstract general ideas; for, in the passages we have
quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed
that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections
8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of
what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which,
considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent
or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this
plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method
of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line
of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless
with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it
represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated
of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general.
And, as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the
name "line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made
general. And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign
of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right lines that
may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality
from the same cause, namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently
denotes.
13. To give the reader a yet clearer
view of the nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought necessary
to, I shall add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding,
(IV. vii. 9) which is as follows: "Abstract ideas are not so obvious or
easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they
seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they
are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that
general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty
with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine.
For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general
idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive,
and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral,
equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once? In effect,
it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts
of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true
the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all
the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement
of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet
one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At
least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are
not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such
as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."- If any man has the faculty
of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described,
it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about
it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself
whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task
for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little
into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have,
an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of
the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle,
equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?"
14. Much is here said of the difficulty
that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite
to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of
great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particular
objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant
about abstract ideas. From all which the natural consequence should seem
to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not
necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts
of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it
is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would
fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty,
and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It
cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious
of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the business of their
childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract
notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard
thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their
sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they
have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in
their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name
they make use of?
15. Nor do I think them a whit more
needful for the enlargement of knowledge than for communication. It is,
I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration
are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not
appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner
premised- universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the
absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation
it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof
it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular,
are rendered universal. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning
triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal idea
of a triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an
idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural;
but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of this or that
sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear
triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All which seems very
plain and not to include any difficulty in it.
16. But here it will be demanded,
how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles,
except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle
which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be demonstrated
to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that
it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in all respects is not
the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles
of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot
therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have
neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to
be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a
particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible,
or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which
all the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all
equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in
view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles
rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless
be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort
or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality,
nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration.
It is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but
then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition.
It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one
of them is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of
the same length. Which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have
been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration
have held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true
of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular
right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition
of the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that
a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to
the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far
he may abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract,
general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider
Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the
fore-mentioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all
that is perceived is not considered.
17. It were an endless as well as
an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction,
through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which
their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into.
What bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised
about those matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived
to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted
on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined
to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider
the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid
out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding
all this the far greater part of them remains full of darkness and uncertainty,
and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are
thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain
in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings
of men, and that, taking all together, a very small portion of them does
supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent
diversion and amusement- I say the consideration of all this is apt to
throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this
may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained
in the world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide
and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract
general ideas.
18. I come now to consider the source
of this prevailing notion, and that seems to me to be language. And surely
nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of
an opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other
reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract
ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which
it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such things as speech
or universal signs there never had been any thought of abstraction. See
III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding. Let us
examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that
mistake.- First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to have,
one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men to think
there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true
and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by
the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify
any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one
precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all
signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which
doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly
appear to anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that
every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification.
For example, a triangle is defined to be "a plain surface comprehended
by three right lines," by which that name is limited to denote one certain
idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not
said whether the surface be great or small, black or white, nor whether
the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they
are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and
consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification
of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to
the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same
idea; the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.
19. But, to give a farther account
how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed
that it is a received opinion that language has no other end but the communicating
our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being
so, and it being withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether
insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is
straightway concluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there
are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest
to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is
what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is
not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant names which
stand for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding
the ideas they are made to stand for- in reading and discoursing, names
being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though
a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it
is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts
that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.
20. Besides, the communicating of
ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is
commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion,
the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some
particular disposition- to which the former is in many cases barely subservient,
and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it,
as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language.
I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often
happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of
fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immediately
in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming
between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were
fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found
that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or
sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions
which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that
are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise
of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the
being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think
not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves
an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion
of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear
to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without
the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would
have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves
do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas
of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example,
when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means
by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission
which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often so instantly
produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment
to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of
his person, writings, or reputation should go before. Innumerable examples
of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things which
every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?
21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility
of Abstract Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them by their
ablest patrons; and endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends
to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to
the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.-
It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means
all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours
of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and
made the possession of one single person. But at the same time it must
be owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and
darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they
are delivered. Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding,
whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked
into my view, keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names
which long and constant use hath so strictly united with them; from which
I may expect to derive the following advantages:
22. First, I shall be sure to get
clear of all controversies purely verbal- the springing up of which weeds
in almost all the sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true
and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate
myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract ideas which has so miserably
perplexed and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance,
that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by
so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein.
Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words,
I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly
and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which
I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas
are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or
disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included
in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than
an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.
23. But the attainment of all these
advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of
words, which I dare hardly promise myself; so difficult a thing it is to
dissolve an union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a habit as that
betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much
increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract
ideas were annexed to their words, it doth not seem strange that they should
use words for ideas- it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside
the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was
perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those
men who have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all
use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas,
have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible
of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the
abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well,
that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from
the words which signify them. But, how good soever this advice may be they
have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves,
so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify
ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a
determinate abstract idea.
24. But, these being known to be
mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on by words.
He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself
in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name.
And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself
the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were,
therefore, to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to
obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from them
all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind
the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into
the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult
the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity-
we need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree of knowledge,
whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.
25. Unless we take care to clear
the First Principles of Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of words,
we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw consequences
from consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall
only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled
in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following
sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking,
and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had
in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the
truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived
by my words, and I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering
his own naked, undisguised ideas.
A TREATISE
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
1. It is evident to any one who takes
a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas
actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending
to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by
help of memory and imagination- either compounding, dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight
I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations.
By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance,
and of all these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling
furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds
to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several
of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by
one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example a certain
colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go
together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple;
other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the
like sensible things- which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite
the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth.
2. But, besides all that endless
variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which
knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining,
remembering, about them. This perceiving, active being is what I call mind,
spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas,
but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein, they exist, or, which
is the same thing, whereby they are perceived- for the existence of an
idea consists in being perceived.
3. That neither our thoughts, nor
passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind,
is what everybody will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various
sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, however blended or combined
together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise
than in a mind perceiving them.- I think an intuitive knowledge may be
obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term
exists, when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists,
that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say
it existed- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive
it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour,
that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour
or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can
understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of
the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their
being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi,
nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking
things which perceive them.
4. It is indeed an opinion strangely
prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all
sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their
being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance
and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world,
yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake
not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the
fore-mentioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do
we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly
repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist
unperceived?
5. If we thoroughly examine this
tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of
abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to
distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived,
so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and
cold, extension and figures- in a word the things we see and feel- what
are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on the
sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from
perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself.
I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other,
those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus,
I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the
smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not
deny, I can abstract- if that may properly be called abstraction which
extends only to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible
may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or
imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence
or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything
without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to
conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the
sensation or perception of it.
6. Some truths there are so near
and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them.
Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven
and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the
mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that
their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they
are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of
any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or
else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit- it being perfectly unintelligible,
and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single
part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To be convinced of which,
the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the
being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.
7. From what has been said it follows
there is not any other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives.
But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible
qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas
perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing
is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one as to perceive;
that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must
perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or
substratum of those ideas.
8. But, say you, though the ideas
themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like
them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without
the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing
but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour
or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find
it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas.
Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which
our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable
or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but
if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert
a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something
which is intangible; and so of the rest.
9. Some there are who make a distinction
betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension,
figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter
they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and
so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances
of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have
our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which
exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter.
By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance,
in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident
from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are
only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but
another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can
exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that that the very
notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction
in it.
10. They who assert that figure,
motion, and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without
the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that
colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not- which
they tell us are sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on
and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute
particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they
can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those
original qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities,
and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly
follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect
and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension
and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part,
I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended
and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality
which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure,
and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where
therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to
wit, in the mind and nowhere else.
11. Again, great and small, swift
and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely
relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense
varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither
great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing
at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and motion in general:
thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing
without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And
here I cannot but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description
of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run
into by their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed
notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers.
Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has
been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same
must also be true of solidity.
12. That number is entirely the creature
of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without,
will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different
denomination of number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus,
the same extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind
considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so
visibly relative, and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange
to think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind.
We say one book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units,
though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is
plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily
put together by the mind.
13. Unity I know some will have to
be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the
mind. That I have any such idea answering the word unity I do not find;
and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it: on the contrary, it
should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accompany
all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion.
To say no more, it is an abstract idea.
14. I shall farther add, that, after
the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities
to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may
be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for
instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind,
and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances
which excite them, for that the same body which appears cold to one hand
seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and
extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter,
because to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture
at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images
of anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved
that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remaining
unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever or
otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is
not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become
swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any
alteration in any external object?
15. In short, let any one consider
those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and
taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force
be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though
it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that
there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not
know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But
the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour
or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist
in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in truth, that there should
be any such thing as an outward object.
16. But let us examine a little the
received opinion.- It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter,
and that Matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you
would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say
you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer,
though you have no positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must
at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is,
yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and
what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident "support" cannot here
be taken in its usual or literal sense- as when we say that pillars support
a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken?
17. If we inquire into what the most
accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by material substance,
we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those
sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative notion
of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me
the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting
accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in
the common sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other
sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the
two parts or branches which make the signification of the words material
substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them.
But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material
substratum or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities?
Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not
this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
18. But, though it were possible
that solid, figured, movable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding
to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this?
Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them
we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that
are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do
not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like
to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.
It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things,
it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately
perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence
of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons
of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt
them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens
in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is
possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there
were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the
supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas;
since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be
produced always in the same order, we see them in at present, without their
concurrence.
19. But, though we might possibly
have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier
to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external
bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least
probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our
minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists
their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer
knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to
comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible
it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production
of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose
Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally
inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible
for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs
be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason
at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless,
and serve to no manner of purpose.
20. In short, if there were external
bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were
not, we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have
now. Suppose- what no one can deny possible- an intelligence without the
help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations
or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness
in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to
believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas,
and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing
the same thing? Of this there can be no question- which one consideration
were enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever
arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without
the mind.
21. Were it necessary to add any
farther proof against the existence of Matter after what has been said,
I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention
impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless
controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater
moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this
place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori are unnecessary for
confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated a
priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of
them.
22. I am afraid I have given cause
to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For, to what
purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost
evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexion?
It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can
conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour to exist
without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see
that what you contend for is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I
am content to put the whole upon this issue:- If you can but conceive it
possible for one extended movable substance, or, in general, for any one
idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving
it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of
external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though
you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign
any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility
of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.
23. But, say you, surely there is
nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or
books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you
may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you,
more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees,
and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive
them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?
This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews you have the power
of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you
can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without
the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing
unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do
our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the
while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of
itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought
of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by
or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth
and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on
any other proofs against the existence of material substance.
24. It is very obvious, upon the
least inquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us
to understand what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects
in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is evident those words mark
out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince
others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to entreat they would
calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness
or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is
requisite for the conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to
wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without
a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and
inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.
25. All our ideas, sensations, notions,
or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished,
are visibly inactive- there is nothing of power or agency included in them.
So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration
in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else
requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every
part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in
them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether
of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity;
there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention
will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness
and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything,
or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can it be the
resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect. 8.
Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be
the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects
of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of
corpuscles, must certainly be false.
26. We perceive a continual succession
of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear.
There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and
which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality
or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. I
must therefore be a substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal
or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is
an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.
27. A spirit is one simple, undivided,
active being- as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and
as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will.
Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever,
being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us,
by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little attention will make
it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active
principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such
is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself
perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man shall
doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try
if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has
ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names will and understanding,
distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being
in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject
of the aforesaid powers- which is signified by the name soul or spirit.
This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul,
spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at
all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being
an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever.
Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul,
spirit, and the operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating-
inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.
28. I find I can excite ideas in
my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit.
It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in
my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another.
This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind
active. Thus much is certain and grounded on experience; but when we think
of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only
amuse ourselves with words.
29. But, whatever power I may have
over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have
not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes,
it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine
what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise
as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not
creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that
produces them.
30. The ideas of Sense are more strong,
lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise
a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those
which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train
or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom
and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules or established methods
wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called
the laws of nature; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us
that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in
the ordinary course of things.
31. This gives us a sort of foresight
which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. And without
this we should be eternally at a loss; we could not know how to act anything
that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense.
That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in
the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to
obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive- all this we
know, not by discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but
only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we
should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know
how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.
32. And yet this consistent uniform
working, which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing
Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature, is so far from leading
our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering after second causes.
For, when we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other
ideas and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute
power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another,
than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example,
having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous
figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called
heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in
like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended
with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.
33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses
by the Author of nature are called real things; and those excited in the
imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly
termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then
our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas,
that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the
ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality
in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures
of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind.
They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which
perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more
powerful spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no idea, whether
faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.
34. Before we proceed any farther
it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably
be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of
which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it
may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this
nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.
First, then, it will be objected
that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature
is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of
ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind, that
is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon and
stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones;
nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions
on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected,
I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one
thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand
remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura,
and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force.
This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is
meant by real things in opposition to chimeras or ideas of our own framing;
but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are
alike ideas.
35. I do not argue against the existence
of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That
the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really
exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we
deny
is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing
of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say,
will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty
name to support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they
have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.
36. If any man thinks this detracts
from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding
what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here
an abstract of what has been said:- There are spiritual substances, minds,
or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure; but
these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive
by sense- which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or
laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and
wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have more reality in
them than the former:- by which is meant that they are more affecting,
orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving
them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and
that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here
given of reality it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and
in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by
our principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term
reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own
thoughts and see.
37. I will be urged that thus much
at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To
this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense-
for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight,
and the like- this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken
in a philosophic sense- for the support of accidents or qualities without
the mind- then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be
said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.
38. But after all, say you, it sounds
very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I
acknowledge it does so- the word idea not being used in common discourse
to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called
things; and it is certain that any expression which varies from the familiar
use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern
the truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say,
we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately
by our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure,
or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several sorts
of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in the mind that
perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas; which
word if it was as ordinarily used as thing, would sound no harsher nor
more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but
the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat
and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which cannot
exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is more
proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather
than ideas.
39. If it be demanded why I make
use of the word idea, and do not rather in compliance with custom call
them things; I answer, I do it for two reasons:- first, because the term
thing in contra-distinction to idea, is generally supposed to denote somewhat
existing without the mind; secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensive
signification than idea, including spirit or thinking things as well as
ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and
are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word idea,
which implies those properties.
40. But, say what we can, some one
perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never
suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty
of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you please,
we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist,
that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own
being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a
proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. We
are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the
contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are
there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid
down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.
41. Secondly, it will be objected
that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the
idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually
being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see,
do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness.
This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which
the answer is evident from what hath been already said; and I shall only
add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of
fire, so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the
idea of the same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either
is, or can possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind,
any more than its idea.
42. Thirdly, it will be objected
that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently
do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen
at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts.
In answer to this, I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do
oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet for all
that, those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the
mind.
43. But, for the fuller clearing
of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive
distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For, that we should
in truth see external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer,
others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath
been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration
of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory
of Vision," which was published not long since, wherein it is shewn that
distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight,
nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that
hath a necessary connexion with it; but that it is only suggested to our
thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which
in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with
distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us
by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same
manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand
for; insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, would not,
at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any
distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.
44. The ideas of sight and touch
make two species entirely distinct and heterogeneous. The former are marks
and prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight neither
exist without mind, nor are the images of external things, was shewn even
in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true
of tangible objects- not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary
for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside
my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning Vision. So
that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them distance
and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us things
actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas of touch
will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and
in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what
has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147
and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the
Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what
tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or
that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point
I refer to the Essay itself.
45. Fourthly, it will be objected
that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated
and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived;
the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no
longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting
my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely
upon opening them it is again created. In answer to all which, I refer
the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he
will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea
distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry
I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by
those words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts,
and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it
possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being
perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge
it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what,
and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those
propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.
46. It will not be amiss to observe
how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable
with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon
closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced
to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge,
when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the
proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no
longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very
incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion
is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge
the existence of Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out
of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine
conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.
47. Farther, a little thought will
discover to us that though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal
substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, from the principles which are
now generally admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever,
do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident
from sect. II and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers
contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which hath none of those particular
qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished
one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that
the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least
by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received
principles demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there
is an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not
perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems
to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts
to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains
an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough
to discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more
acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the
object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities
which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different
lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length,
after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely
acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration
in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in
itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all shape or figure.
From which it follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter
to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves
are by their own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular
bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind.
Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite
and shapeless, and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies
which compose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer
than it is perceived.
48. If we consider it, the objection
proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles
we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against our
notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing
else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude
they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since
there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever
bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood
to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does
not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated
and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between
our perception of them.
49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected
that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the
mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or attribute which
(to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists.
I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by
it- that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea;
and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension
exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those
colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else.
As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless
and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended,
and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance,
distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated
of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems
to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or
accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute
those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only
an explication of the meaning of the word die.
50. Sixthly, you will say there have
been a great many things explained by matter and motion; take away these
and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical
principles which have been applied with so much success to account for
the phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient
or modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition
that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer
that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which
may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear
by an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as
to shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and
such ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea
in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore
evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they
who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance, but
by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth no more than
mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been
already shewn. See sect. 25.
51. Seventhly, it will upon this
be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes,
and ascribe everything to the immediate operation of Spirits? We must no
longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that
a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at,
who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so; in such things
we ought to "think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar." They who
to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do
nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian";
and if they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt
appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make
it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of
alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.
52. In the ordinary affairs of life,
any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments,
or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being,
how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense.
Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language
is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence
it is impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far
to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a
handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But,
a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor
and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes
of speech which use has made inevitable.
53. As to the opinion that there
are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of
the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers,
who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the
immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all
the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included
in it; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies
they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects
of sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of
created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any
one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose,
since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say,
though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and
extravagant supposition.
54. In the eighth place, the universal
concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument
in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose
the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of
so widespread and predominant an error? I answer, first, that, upon a narrow
inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really
believe the existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking,
to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it,
is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort,
I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed,
men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if
the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every moment,
and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being.
But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words,
and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to
conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon themselves,
by imagining they believe those propositions which they have often heard,
though at bottom they have no meaning in them.
55. But secondly, though we should
grant a notion to be never so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet
this is weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number
of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost
tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of
mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were
looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it
be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind,
we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable
footing in the world.
56. But it is demanded that we assign
a cause of this prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world.
To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several ideas, whereof
they themselves were not the authors- as not being excited from within
nor depending on the operation of their wills- this made them maintain
those ideas, or objects of perception had an existence independent of and
without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved
in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate
objects of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree
corrected the mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another
which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really
existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being
perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted
by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes
its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious
that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently
knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause
distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.
57. But why they should suppose the
ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not
rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for,
first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well
in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing
to them power or activity. Secondly, because the Supreme Spirit which excites
those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by
any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are
by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His
operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted
by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But,
when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us
any reflexion; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument
of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so
constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects
of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting,
though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom.
58. Tenthly, it will be objected
that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths
in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is
now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest
and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can
be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it
be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is not perceived
by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to
agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question whether the
earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether
we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers,
that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such
a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive
the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all
respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature
which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena.
59. We may, from the experience we
have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often make,
I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions
concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train
of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have
appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different
from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature,
which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath
been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the
like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries
in astronomy or nature.
60. In the eleventh place, it will
be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants,
and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables
grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their
motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly
contrived and put together; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or
operative in them, nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed
to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a
fiat or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial
in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine,
though an artist hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement of
a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the
motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and
that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour
of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being
at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does
not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that
whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding
disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by a skilful
hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature,
great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned
by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles,
any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable
multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which
in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve
to explain abundance of phenomena?
61. To all which I answer, first,
that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration
of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature,
which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection
could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things
which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration.
Secondly, but neither are the received principles free from the like difficulties;
for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout
methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can
deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all
that apparatus; nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection
may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those
machines without of mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk,
figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as
to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever
therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the supposition possible) when
they are not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose; since the only
use that is assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce
those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything
but Spirit.
62. But, to come nigher the difficulty,
it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and
organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it
is necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way according
to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through
the whole chain of natural effects; these are learned by the observation
and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial
things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena-
which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular
phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing,
in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects;
as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein
philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great
and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed
by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible
that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are necessary,
though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing
it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance,
it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules
the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle,
cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever
made the movements and put them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably
to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained
in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker,
whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production
of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended
with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which
being once corrected all is right again.
63. It may indeed on some occasions
be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in
producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions
from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into
an acknowledgement of the Divine Being; but then they are to be used but
seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that
effect. Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes
by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and contrivance
in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence
in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being
by anomalous and surprising events.
64. To set this matter in a yet clearer
light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts
in reality to no more than this:- ideas are not anyhow and at random produced,
there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of
cause and effect; there are also several combinations of them made in a
very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments
in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have
a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the
theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious
eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another,
to what purpose is that connexion? And, since those instruments, being
barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the
production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in
other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a
close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully
laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being credible that
He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity
to no purpose.
65. To all which my answer is, first,
that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect,
but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see
is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark
that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the
effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the
sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines,
that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for
combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to
signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be
variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and
universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise contrivance.
By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning
what we are to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper
to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which in effect is all
that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by discerning
a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether
natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties
depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.
66. Hence, it is evident that those
things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to
the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into
great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and
obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or
signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring
to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature, that ought
to be the employment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending
to explain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too
much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme
and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, and have our being."
67. In the twelfth place, it may
perhaps be objected that- though it be clear from what has been said that
there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured,
movable substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe
Matter- yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive
ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means
only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the
mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence
whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear but that
Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say,
first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents,
than it is to suppose accidents without a substance. But secondly, though
we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can
it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed; and that
it exists not in place is no less certain- since all place or extension
exists only in the mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore
that it exists nowhere at all.
68. Let us examine a little the description
that is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is
perceived; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless,
unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives,
excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting.
But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly
this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered.
But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presence of which ideas
are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything
can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion,
nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended,
nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to be present,"
when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning,
and which I am not able to comprehend.
69. Again, let us examine what is
meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language,
that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else
something that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary
course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above described,
it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said to be passive
and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable,
as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion
of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning my finger is
said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can
be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either used in no sense
at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.
70. You will Perhaps say that Matter,
though it be not perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to
whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. For, say you, since
we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner,
it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular
occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain
permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which,
though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect
us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless
to God, by whom they art perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind
Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds; that so things may go
on in a constant uniform manner.
71. In answer to this, I observe
that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer
concerning the existence of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from
perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain ideas
of I know not what sort, in the mind of God which are so many marks or
notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant
and regular method- much after the same manner as a musician is directed
by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition
of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not
perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion
of Matter seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is
in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is
no senseless unperceived substance.
72. If we follow the light of reason,
we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the
goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but this
is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it
is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful
is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature. But,
as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least
connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see
any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any
manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can
have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of
that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently
shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that
it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and
what this amounts to we have just now seen.
73. It is worth while to reflect
a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of material
substance; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of
those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that
was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure,
motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really
exist without the mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose
some unthinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they
could not be conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of
time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible,
secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this
substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary
ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist
without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support.
But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise
than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows that we have no
longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly
impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken
to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they
exist without the mind.
74. But though it be allowed by the
materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of
supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect
the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the
belief of what was solely grounded thereon; yet the prejudice is riveted
so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it,
and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is indefensible, at
least to retain the name, which we apply to I know not what abstracted
and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of
reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or
what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are
imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be
inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion?
and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can
there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by
an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds?
75. It is a very extraordinary instance
of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man
retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a
stupid thoughtless somewhat, by the interposition whereof it would as it
were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off
from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure
the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to
support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we
indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by
reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that
there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything,
is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And
this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.
76. Whether therefore there are such
Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name Matter,
I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance
or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to
me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since
it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported
by an unperceiving substance.
77. But, say you, though it be granted
that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities
or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving
substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to
us as colours are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted
to them. But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of
their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light
and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only
the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there
is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us; and I do not see the
advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know
not why.
78. But, secondly, if we had a new
sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we
should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance
that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour and
the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but sensations
or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true
not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of
all possible ideas whatsoever.
79. But, you will insist, what if
I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign
any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant
by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists,
and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas; though
indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication
of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when
words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please
without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example,
that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take
the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks
of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an
inert thoughtless substance without accidents which is the occasion of
our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the
other.
80. In the last place, you will say,
what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that
Matter is an unknown somewhat- neither substance nor accident, spirit nor
idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible
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